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 Just Fatherlands? Judging the 
Shoah in Strasbourg 
 CAROLE  LYONS *  
 In the twentieth century, there will be an extraordinary nation. It will be a great 
nation but its grandeur will not limit its freedom. It will be famous, wealthy, poetic, 
cordial to the rest of humanity … it will be called Europe. Europe … will be called 
humanity. Humanity, defi nitive nation … what a majestic vision! 1 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 THE PRIMARY PREOCCUPATION of this chapter is an examination of how Europe’s highest human rights court works through the enduring effects of the ‘moral catastrophe’ of the Holocaust. 2 The issue of the role of past 
inhumanity within Europe’s present is fundamental and informs (or ought to) the 
ways in which justice is done and understood in Europe as a whole. This chapter 
concentrates on one judicial forum, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
and the continuing influence of the Holocaust/Shoah within its jurisprudence. The 
focus on a particular past in the evolution of European human rights raises general 
questions as to how history and memory are mediated through the judicial route 
and, more specifically, how the legacy of Auschwitz has helped to mould the human 
rights culture which now guides 47 European states, including the 28 EU Member 
States. The importance of mutual dependency of the EU States has been raised by 
other contributions to this volume. This chapter suggests that such mutual depen-
dency would be difficult to arrive at in the absence of a parallel mutual confronta-
tion of the past. Mutuality and solidarity, written into, if not consistently respected 
within, European integration, are rooted in an implicit shared, European responsi-
bility for the shaping of an ethical response to institutionalised racist killing. András 
Sajó, in his chapter in this collection, discusses the concept of the ‘responsible 
 *   With much gratitude for the generosity of Gráinne de Búrca, Dimitry Kochenov and Andrew  Williams. 
 1  V  Hugo ,  ‘L’avenir’ in Paris ( Paris ,  Introduction to the Paris Guide ,  1867 ) 11 cited in  J  Derrida , 
 The Politics of Friendship ( London ,  Verso ,  1997 )  264 . 




community’ in respect of past injustices and how that responsibility equates to 
‘patrolling our moral borders’. 3 Applied to integration processes in Europe it might 
be posited that the European ( responsible ) community has Greece (and all the other 
EU Member States) absorb Germany’s past shame, 4 while Germany assists debt 
recovery in Greece. The constantly alluded to, but nonetheless nebulous,  acquis 
communitaire which governs the EU integration compact, is not exactly explicit on 
such a distribution of debt and disgrace. 5 Turning to European human rights pro-
cesses specifically, although it might be questioned how much the ‘just fatherlands’ 6 
anticipated while the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was being 
drafted in 1950 have been achieved, the ECtHR is a forum where an encounter with 
the past has been taking place, to a greater or lesser extent, for over 50 years. Judge 
Sajó’s chapter asks us to re-examine accepted notions of victimhood which lie at 
the root of the judicial approach to past collective injustices. This chapter offers a 
pragmatic complement to that thesis in identifying the stages of Holocaust-specific 
case-law from Strasbourg and placing an analysis of that Court’s approach to the 
Shoah in the context of a consideration of the extent and nature of a justice deficit 
in the European legal space. 
 Digging up the past is all the rage these days. Literally, in the case of King 
Richard III in a Leicester car park 7 and Federico García Lorca in Andalucia 8 but, 
more significantly, in the continuing search for those responsible for past injustices 
such as Hungarian Nazis in an Australian court, 9 Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón’s 
(ill-fated) pursuit of civil war crimes against humanity in Spain, 10  multiple 
 apologies for past wrongs, slavery, famines, 11 even Wayne Rooney goes to 
    3  A Sajó, ‘Victimhood and Vulnerability As Sources of Justice’ in this volume, 337, at 340. 
    4  Habermas, ‘Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis’, n 2 above, on the continuing necessity 
of this ‘exchange’ for Germany. 
    5  The debt element of this ‘bargain’ has been addressed in the 2011–12 ‘six pack’ and ‘two pack’ 
EU economic measures but without concomitant attention to social or historical context. See, generally, 
 B  de Witte ,  H  Héritier and  AH  Trechsel (eds),  The Euro Crisis and the State of European Democracy 
( Fiesole ,  European University Institute ,  2013 ) . Read a prosaic defi nition of the  acquis communautaire 
at  www.europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm . 
    6  ‘I think that from our First Session we can unanimously proclaim that in Europe there will  henceforth 
only be  just fatherlands.’ Pierre-Henri Teitgen, addressing the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, Strasbourg, August 1949, discussing the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
He was recalling his father’s memory of an inscription on the gates at Buchenwald concentration camp 
which read ‘Just or unjust, the Fatherland’.  MW  Janis ,  RS  Kay and  AW  Bradley ,  European Human Rights 
Law :  Text and Materials ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2008 )  14 . 
    7  The body of the last king of England to die in battle (in 1485) was discovered under a car park in 
Leicester in 2012:  www.le.ac.uk/richardiii/ . 
    8  ‘Spanish judge orders poet García Lorca’s grave to be opened’  The Guardian (16 October 2008), 
 www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/16/lorca-grave-spain ; and ‘Lorca mystery may soon be solved but 
much of Spain’s past remains buried’  The Guardian (1 December 2014),  http://www.theguardian.com/
culture/2014/dec/01/-sp-garcia-lorca-mystery-solved-spain-remains-buried . 
    9  Minister for Home Affairs of the Commonwealth v Zentai [ 2012 ].  HCA 28 (15 August 2012) . 
 10  ‘Baltasar Garzón cleared over his Franco-era crimes inquiry’  The Guardian (27 February 2012), 
 www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/27/baltasar-garzon-cleared-franco-crimes . 
 11  Such as Prime Minister David Cameron’s apology for the killings of civilians in Northern Ireland in 
1972 ( www.bbc.co.uk/news/10320609 ) and Prime Minister Tony Blair’s apology for the Irish Famine of 
the 1840s ( www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-17124401 ). 
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Auschwitz. 12 Times change; the culture of commemoration (and confession), now 
so popular and populist, was sidelined for many years of the twentieth  century. 13 
Dealing with and genuinely facing up to the past is another matter, long ignored in 
European legal analysis but now taken more seriously. 14 It is trite to note that any 
entity which seeks to progress needs to be aware of its history but, nonetheless, this 
banality does expose a dearth at the core of unity and integration in Europe. The 
Council of Europe, the EU and their institutions have devoted scant space to the 
development of a formal recognition of the past which could ethically underpin 
the highly contested future of European integration. As if from  terra nullius born, 
the shiny structures of European unity largely ignored their sombre origins. As 
András Sajó remarks, ‘The current European system is based on assumptions 
generated by the experiences of World War II … a genuine concern about victims 
of past injustice emerged within this frame, but only relatively lately and with a 
great deal of hesitation …’. 15 This lacuna cannot but impact upon the nature and 
the extent of justice emanating from European institutions. 
 Andrew Williams, who has written of the ‘uncertain soul of Europe’, 16 has high-
lighted the failures of the human rights systems in Strasbourg, heralding a new 
awareness beyond the conventional appreciation of the ECHR and its Court. These 
failures are not only at the all too well-known structural, practical level; 17 rather, it 
is the ‘broken dream’, ‘the disjuncture between the moment of the text, its genesis 
and the reality of its … application’. 18 The ECHR was drafted in the shadow of the 
Shoah yet has no regard to institutionalised killing or genocide. 19 He argues that, in 
ignoring the reality of the Holocaust and absent the recognition of its relationship 
with the new human rights regime, ‘the Convention was a singular failure’. 20 What 
is at issue is ‘the conceptual purpose’ of this foundational text; ‘the Convention has 
 12  Wayne Rooney is a footballer who plays for Manchester United and England, ‘England  players 
visit Auschwitz and meet Holocaust survivor’  The Guardian (8 June 2012),  www.theguardian.com/ 
football/2012/jun/08/euro-2012-england-players-visit-auschwitz . The issue of footballers’  appreciation of 
the Holocaust and anti-Semitism has arisen also in the case of Nicolas Anelka making an  anti- Semitic  gesture 
(the so-called  quenelle ) during a football match in 2013:  www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/ football/25870640 . This 
contrasting behaviour was discussed in the UK Parliament during a lengthy  debate to mark Holocaust 
Memorial Day (27 January in the UK and Europe), House of Commons Hansard Debates (23 January 
2014), a remarkable debate which included a reading of Primo Levi’s poem  Shema . 
 13  The long awaited resolution of the claim of the families of thousands of soldiers murdered by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the forest of Katy ń in 1940 offers a case study in changing 
perceptions about justice, memory and responsibility over the second half of the 20th century,  Janowiec 
and Others v Russia App Nos  55508/07 and 29520/09 [ 2014 ]  58 EHRR 30 (ECtHR (GC) , 21 October 
2013). See, generally,  A  Etkind ,  R  Finnin et al,  Remembering Katy ń  ( Cambridge ,  Polity Press ,  2012 ) . 
 14  Eg, the groundbreaking work of, inter alia, Vivian Curran, David Fraser, Christian Joerges and Tom 
Mertens. 
 15  Sajó, ‘Victimhood and Vulnerability’ in this volume, 337, at 338. 
 16  A  Williams ,  The Ethos of Europe :  Values, Law and Justice in the EU ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge 
 University Press ,  2010 )  1 . 
 17  See, generally,  S  Greer ,  The European Convention on Human Rights :  Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press ,  2006 ) . 
 18  A  Williams , ‘ Burying, Not Praising the European Convention on Human Rights ’ in  N  Walker , 
 J  Shaw and  S  Tierney (eds),  Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2012 )  78 ; and 
 A  Williams , ‘ The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU and the UK :  Confronting a Heresy ’ 
( 2013 )  24  European Journal of International Law  1157 . 
 19  Williams, ‘Burying, Not Praising’, n 18 above, 79. 
 20  ibid. 
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failed any conception of human rights that includes memorial goals’. 21 What might 
thus be termed the original sin of the ECHR system is then perpetuated; the entire 
system of human rights in Strasbourg is corralled by the ECHR, its content, its 
register, its limitations and the deficits which lie at it source. The Convention text 
rigidly frames, literally and analytically, the functioning of European human rights 
so much so that, instead of the now constantly debated institutional and structural 
reform, it might be apt to wonder if it is not time to cut up the map,  à la Debord, 
and discover the text anew. 22 Williams, too, ultimately suggests the need for a ‘fun-
damental re-conceptualisation of the central purpose (or values) of human rights’. 23 
 In the mid-1980s, in West Germany, a public debate took place between his-
torians and philosophers engendered by Ernst Nolte’s article in the  Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung on ‘The Past That Will Not Pass’. 24 Termed the  Historikerstreit , 
it provoked lengthy debate about what was seen as Nolte’s apologia for the 
Holocaust and his intimation that a line be drawn under the Nazi past. Since that 
time, the opposite has arguably been the case; the dramatic political events of 1989, 
the new Germany and a generalised culture shift towards historical reflection, has 
resulted in an increased focus on the era of the Second World War. This has been 
reflected in the ECtHR in leading, recent judgments relating to mass executions in 
Poland 1940 25 and partisan murders in Latvia in 1944. 26 However, the ECtHR has 
not always been so preoccupied with events which predated its establishment. The 
 Stunde Null mentality, which prevailed in Europe in 1945, passed over inaudibly to 
the early decades of the functioning of the new European human rights system such 
that the primordial era of case-law at the ECtHR was affected by a certain degree 
of historical amnesia. 27 Thus, the judicial forum conceived with a view to ensuring 
‘the principle of collective responsibility for the maintenance of human rights’ 28 
did not originally generate a supranational conscience to deal with what had been, 
de facto and de jure, supranational infraction. Bates identifies the major motivating 
force for the ECHR as a collective Western European pact against totalitarianism. 29 
 21  ibid, 80. 
 22  Guy  Debord , in  Psychogeographic Guide of Paris ( Copenhagen ,  Permild & Rosengreen ,  1955 ) cuts 
up the map of Paris to facilitate a new perspective on and awareness of the city and take people away 
from the well-travelled, predictable routes. Following a Debordian line, you might say, further, that the 
European Convention represents the ‘hard’ or physical structure of European human rights whereas the 
Court’s case-law is the ‘soft’, shifting element of Strasbourg justice. 
 23  Williams, ‘Burying, Not Praising’, n 18 above, 93. 
 24  See, generally,  R  Evans ,  In Hitler’s Shadow :  West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape 
From the Nazi Past ( New York ,  NY ,  Alfred A Knopf ,  1989 ) . 
 25  Janowiec and Others v Russia App Nos  55508/07 and 29520/09 (ECtHR,  16 April 2012 ) and, on 
appeal, [2014] 58 EHRR 30 (ECtHR (GC), 21 October 2013). 
 26  Kononov v Latvia App No  36376/04 (ECtHR,  24 July 2008 ) and, on appeal, (GC) 17 May 2010. 
 27  ‘We have witnessed periods of historical amnesia before. In the 1950s and 1960s, only a handful 
of memoirs and studies served to record and recall the Holocaust. The subject was virtually taboo, a 
 consequence of the fi rst and universally affi rmed  Stunde Null ’.  D  Klein , ‘ The Fate of Holocaust Literature ’ 
in  S  Friedman (ed),  Holocaust Literature ( Westport ,  CT ,  Greenwood Press ,  1993 ) xvi. 
 28  Council of Europe,  Collected Edition of the ‘ Travaux Préparatoires ’ of the European Convention on 
Human Rights Vol I (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) 36 cited in Janis, Kay and Bradley,  European 
Human Rights Law , n 6 above, 16. 
 29  E  Bates ,  The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2010 )  5, 6 . Though this text explores, in depth, the origins and early years of the Convention 
 system, it does not have any index entry under ‘Holocaust’. 
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This focus on creating a bulwark for the denizens of the ‘free’ West against the 
perceived threat from the East may account for, though not justify, the relative invis-
ibility of the Holocaust for many decades at the ECtHR. 
 Generally, Holocaust related jurisprudence oscillates between the infamous (such 
as Eichmann, Ivan the Terrible), the misconceived or misunderstood (the Nuremberg 
trial so called had only limited Holocaust related focus) 30 and the largely ignored 
or unknown (the  Zyklon B case, a criminal trial in a British military court with no 
reasoned judgment). 31 Much of this case-law is separated from the contemporary 
European legal space by distances of time and geography. The European legal 
order, which can be said, as a whole, to embrace both EU and Council of Europe 
institutions, has, apparently, been saved many of the challenges of institutionally 
confronting the collapse into savagery that was the Shoah. Yet, any enquiry into 
the meaning and limits of justice in Europe would acknowledge that the delivery 
of justice today needs to take account of lapses in justice in the past. This chapter, 
therefore, teases out the approach of the Strasbourg institutions towards the Shoah 
over the decades since their creation. The judgments and decisions looked at here 
are highlighted not only because of their relevance to an examination of justice in 
Europe but because of their intrinsic value in themselves in exposing something 
about the nature of European human rights approaches since 1959. The aim is to 
cast away the cobwebs from some significant but ignored case-law and to expose 
the details of some of those whose fate at Strasbourg was shaped by the Holocaust, 
its reality and its legacy. Dealing with the Shoah is an ongoing process, just as defin-
ing the meaning of justice in Europe is a process. In this volume, that latter process 
is approached largely from the inside, endogenously, from an EU perspective on 
the EU. This chapter steps back a little from ‘Brussels’ and examines the nature of 
European justice from an external perspective based on an assertion that justice has 
no conceptual borders; the EU and the Council of Europe are a collective experi-
ment in the fashioning of a (just) Europe. As Allot asserts, ‘Europe will be made 
by the Europe that Europe has made. Europe will be made by its own idea of what 
Europe could be’ 32 and that ‘Europe’ is both Brussels  and Strasbourg. 
 The current academic and political preoccupation with the ECtHR has two focal 
points; reform of the Court system 33 and the accession of the European Union to 
the ECHR. 34 In other words, the focus is clearly on a modified future. The emphasis 
in this chapter faces towards the past rather than the future and examines the early 
decades of human rights adjudication from one specific perspective. The Holocaust 
constituted an extreme, extensive violation of what would, post facto, be classi-
fied as human rights yet Strasbourg proved not to be the locale for collective or 
 30  See  W  Schabas ,  Unimaginable Atrocities ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) ;  D  Fraser ,  Law 
After Auschwitz ( Durham ,  NC ,  Carolina Academic Press ,  2005 ) ; and  KJ  Heller ,  The Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2011 ) . 
 31  Case No 9, The Zyklon B Case ,  The Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals, United Nations War Crimes Commission, Vol 1, London, HMSO (1947). 
 32  P  Allott , ‘ The European Community Is Not the True European Community ’ ( 1991 )  100  Yale Law 
Journal  2485, 2490 . 
 33  Greer,  The European Convention on Human Rights , n 17 above. 
 34  See  P  Gragli ,  The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights 
( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2013 ) . 
386 Carole Lyons
high profile claims (which went to Jerusalem or Germany). Instead, the ECtHR 
records reveal decades of small scale, individual judgments and decisions, more 
often than not declared inadmissible, and which testify to the absence of any overt 
consciousness of the specificity of adjudicating Shoah related claims. This approach 
did, however, gradually begin to alter in the 1990s with Holocaust denial case-law 
and, more recently, with a heightened awareness of the Holocaust in freedom of 
 expression case-law. 
 It could be said that the achievement of European human rights justice can be 
categorised as a type of  fractal justice, the constantly shifting edges of which can 
never be fully measured. Nonetheless, some strata are identifiable. The evolution in 
Shoah related case-law in Strasbourg might be classified as follows: 
 1950s–80s  Amnesia —no specifi c recognition of the uniqueness of the Holocaust 
despite direct confrontation with victims; 
 1990s  Negationism— the emergence of a corpus of case-law on Holocaust denial; 
freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR) cases involving Holocaust denial/
negation or revision; also post-1989 property related compensation claims; 35 
 2010s  Particularity— case law involving the use of Holocaust related language 36 
as well as continuing compensation claims. 37 At the same time a new, overt, 
insistence that ‘the Court is not a forum for the resolution of historical disputes’. 38 
 As institutions, the Council of Europe and the ECtHR provide Europe with a unique 
collective structure for remembrance, which is not replicated elsewhere in Europe. 
Every European state constantly creates and recreates its own individual history 
and memory; what Strasbourg offers, under the radar of both general apprecia-
tion of the ECtHR as a judicial body and outside the scope of general historical 
analysis, is a significant source of  European memory mediated through a judicial 
lens. The HUDOC database is saturated with beguiling, complex and unexplored 
narratives, of the victims and the vulnerable of course, 39 but also the victors. The 
Strasbourg judiciary has over 50 years’ experience of exposure to the European 
past; that time has evidenced ebbs and flows but is always present, even more so 
today than in 1959. In that respect, it has been, effectively, the first and longest 
serving transitional justice court or, perhaps, an involuntary, unintended and unrec-
ognised ‘Truth Commission for Europe’. The literature on the ECtHR as a ‘manager 
 35  Such as  Slowik v Poland  App No 30641/96 (ECommHR Decision,  16 April 1998 ) , an unsuccessful 
attempt to establish ownership of a planned parking lot in Warsaw which had previously been owned by 
two Jewish people killed in a concentration camp. 
 36  Such as  PETA Deutschland v Germany App No  43481/09 [2012] ECHR 1888 (ECtHR,  8  November 
2012 ) (discussed below). 
 37  Such as  Poznanski and Others v Germany App No  25101/05 (ECtHR,  3 July 2007 ) (Jewish forced 
labourers at Auschwitz at the IG Farben factory based there). The applicants asserted that the maximum 
EUR 7,500 compensation for such slave labour was too low and, generally, that the compensation scheme 
was established to protect the interest of German industry and not the rights of forced labourers. The 
application was declared inadmissible. 
 38  As stated in  LZ v Slovakia App No  27753/06 (ECtHR,  27 September 2011 ) (a Jewish applicant’s 
 attempt to stop a village street being named after Jozef Tiso, president of Slovakia during the Second 
World War), ‘the Court is aware of the highly sensitive nature of the issues involved in the present case 
and its context … However, it emphasises from the outset that it is not its task to settle possible points of 
debate among historians’ (para 65). 
 39  See, further, András Sajó, ‘Victimhood and Vulnerability As Sources of Justice’ in this volume, 337. 
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of memory’ is sparse as most such work tends towards high profile case-law in 
Germany (Nuremberg, Frankfurt, etc) or Israel, 40 but the ECtHR has in fact had to 
process the legacy of the Shoah and the Second World War more frequently than 
any other single judicial body. This has occurred in spite of the original conceptual 
failures highlighted above. The  Katyń judgment 41 is a recent and one of the most 
high profile of the ‘history cases’ in Strasbourg. Yet, it is low profile, unremem-
bered decisions which constitute the main body of the ECtHR’s claim to a status 
as an institution ‘working through the past’. 42 An examination of widely scattered 
decisions and judgments from the perspective of the ECtHR encountering Europe’s 
pasts exposes the extent to which ‘thick descriptions of everyday life’, 43 tragic and 
non-tragic, are judged and, at one and the same time, the judges themselves judged 
too, especially from the perspective of the global conceptual purpose they might or 
could serve in this context. 
 There are several foundational questions relevant to an attempt to assess the 
ECtHR as a court of memory/history. First, who is or should be a ‘victim’ in the 
Strasbourg system? All Strasbourg applicants are formally classed as ‘victims’ 
(under Article 34 ECHR) but this is not inherently a neutral concept (an issue which 
is further explored in analysis of the National Socialist applications below). There is 
also the impenetrable question of what people choose to  do with their memories and 
their narratives; if you have witnessed  Kristallnacht , been incarcerated at several 
extermination/concentration camps and lost all your family at Auschwitz, 44 what 
can human rights judges offer you? Why would you have faith in a legal system 
when another such system had so effectively enabled the atrocity? What purpose 
do human rights courts serve in relation to the uncompensatable? Beyond those 
questions is a consideration of how memory, mediated through the judicial route, 
represents and shapes the judges as well as the ‘victims’. Furthermore, the gover-
nance or management of memory by and in judicial  fora arguably runs counter to 
the very nature of memory itself; the very purpose of all judicial decisions is to  close 
and finalise the legal issue in hand, to draw a line under the arguments raised, thus 
institutionalising or forcing a false forgetfulness rather than recognising the validity 
of a victim’s memory and its endurance. 
 This overview of the work of the ECtHR has a specific interest in examining the 
Jewish presence in the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Do Jews go to court in Europe? 45 
Specifically, to what extent have European Jews benefited from the human rights 
court which was established as the extermination camps closed? There is wide-
spread dissemination of knowledge about Jewish death within the European arena 
 40  See, eg, Fraser,  Law After Auschwitz , n 30 above. 
 41  Janowiec and Others v Russia App Nos  55508/07 and 29520/09 (ECtHR,  16 April 2012 ) and, on 
appeal, [2014] 58 EHRR 30 (ECtHR (GC), 21 October 2013). 
 42  T  Adorno , ‘ The Meaning of Working Through the Past ’ in  T  Adorno ,  Can One Live After 
 Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader , ed  R  Tiedemann ( Stanford ,  CA ,  Stanford University Press ,  2003 )  3 . 
 43  M  Stolleis , ‘ The Spidery Monster :  Inga Markovitz’s Brilliant History of the GDR’s Judiciary ’ ( 2007 ) 
 8  German Law Journal  195 . 
 44  The facts of  X v Germany  App No 627/59 (ECommHR Decision,  14 December 1961 ) (Auschwitz 
survivor), discussed below. 
 45  See  C  Lyons , ‘ The Persistence of Memory ’ ( 2007 )  32  European Law Review  563 for a similar 
 question posed as regards the European Court of Justice. 
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(museums, documentation centres, education programmes and the like) but far 
less awareness of Jewish  life in Europe, now and then. 46 The victims have become 
obscured by their killers in the institutional and judicial response to the Shoah. The 
high profile  Einsatzgruppen military trials in 1947–48, the Eichmann trial in 1961, 
the series of extermination camp trials in Germany in the 1970s, the Demjanjuk 
(wrongly assumed to be Ivan the Terrible) trial in Jerusalem 1986, these have all 
 easily entered the vocabulary and culture of atrocity to the detriment of those 
 millions who were exterminated. Eichmann lives on (thanks to Arendt inter alia) 47 
but Walter Benjamin’s brother, Raphael Lemkin’s family, Jerry Springer’s grand-
mothers and Stephen Fry’s great grandparents 48 are all eclipsed and forgotten. 
There is a superficial parallel in Strasbourg where many of the names of cases/
decisions involving Jews are rendered as  X versus (offering the protection but also 
the negation of anonymity) but those cases with convicted Nazi applicants from 
Germany are named and known. In general, it is fair to state that much judicial 
and academic space devoted to the consideration of the consequences of National 
Socialism has revolved around its adherents and not its victims; we readily debate 
the concept of ‘banality of evil’ in the seminar room but rarely analyse the detail of, 
for example, the  Einsatzgruppen trials or of how Treblinka functioned. 
 The chapter structure adopts the conceit of the concept of  stolpersteine 49 for an 
identification of significant markers in the pathway towards the ECtHR’s recogni-
tion of Shoah specificity within the canon of European human rights. The idea 
behind the  stolperstein is to symbolise the return of the lost person to their neigh-
bourhood and community. The focus on Holocaust case-law here suggests that 
Strasbourg case-law is, too, a means of conveying individual, ignored, Shoah victims 
back to the European legal community. More generally, ECtHR adjudication is a 
means of bringing (back) the Holocaust into the realm of European justice. One 
of the most recent  stolperstein , from November 2012, is the minority opinion in 
 PETA , 50 which forcefully argues for the European wide relevance of the Holocaust 
and its legacy. Fifty years before, the Strasbourg human rights system and its institu-
tions were relatively oblivious to those few applicants who ‘stumbled’ before them 
and making no case for Shoah relevance in the formation of a new human rights sys-
tem. This chapter outlines the steps on that passage from a dearth of acknowledge-
ment of the relevance of the Holocaust towards a more recent intimation that the 
uniqueness of the Shoah may necessitate a distinct—and European— interpretation 
of Convention rights. 
 46  But see the important, recent series of reports from the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency  showing 
a rise in anti-Semitism across Europe, ‘Discrimination and Hate Crime Against Jews in EU Member 
States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism’ (November 2013),  www.fra.europa.eu/en/ 
publication/2013/discrimination-and-hate-crime-against-jews-eu-member-states-experiences-and . 
 47  H  Arendt ,  Eichmann in Jerusalem :  A Report on the Banality of Evil ( London ,  Penguin Books ,  2006 ) . 
 48  All of whom were killed in Nazi-occupied Europe. 
 49  A project devised and implemented by German artist Gunter Demnig which involves placing small 
brass plaques—to be ‘stumbled’ over—in the pavements outside the last known addresses of those killed 
in the Holocaust. See  www.stolpersteine.eu/en/ . 
 50  PETA Deutschland v Germany App No  43481/09 [2012] ECHR  1888 (ECtHR,  8 November 2012 ) , 
Concurring Opinion of Judges Zupan č ič and Spielmann. 
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 II. THE LEGEND OF THE JUST MEN 
 Justice in Strasbourg is primarily the responsibility of the judges of the Court. Now, 
and in the past, are these judges who can give/write judgments equal to the events 
they judge, 51 specifically in the context of contentious claims arising from or related 
to Europe’s past? Have victims always been served by ‘just men’? 52 Relevant also 
to a questioning of the who and how of human rights justice in Strasbourg is a 
recall of the complex juxtaposition of different layers of adjudication in Europe; 
take, for example, the early 1960s. Seven men in Luxembourg are fashioning, 
from Dutch tax law and Italian electricity prices, the constitutional foundations of 
the EU in  Van Gend & Loos 53 and  Costa/ENEL ; 54 the ECtHR, meantime, in  de 
Becker , 55 is adjudicating the claims of a convicted Second World War collaborator; 
the Commission in Strasbourg is declaring inadmissible the claim of an Auschwitz 
survivor; 56 in Düsseldorf, criminal judges are dealing with the killing of 900,000 
people in one year (the Treblinka trials). 57 In other words, meting out justice, or 
assessing the quality or extent of that justice, in post-war ‘Europe’, broadly defined, 
is not quantifiable on any simplistic level. 
 There is also the issue of distance from the past, from the events of the specific 
claim, in Strasbourg case-law dealing with the Holocaust. In the 1960s, dur-
ing the early phase of Shoah case-law, the judges and members of the European 
Commission had direct, lived experience of the facts before them. Today, the facts 
will inevitably have become ‘history’ for the judges (if not always necessarily for 
the applicants). How might this distance/proximity issue have altered the nature 
of human rights judging? Barthes reminds us that ‘History is hysterical: it is con-
stituted only if we consider it, only if we look at it and in order to look at it, we 
must be excluded from it. Michelet was able to write virtually nothing about his 
own time’. 58 The process of dealing with the past, a process which has acquired a 
(too convenient?) German appellation,  Vergangenheitsbewältigung is, intrinsically, 
a delayed process; the past cannot be dealt with as such until it has in fact become 
the ‘past’. This may account for the increased recognition of the Holocaust in the 
 51  Taussig recalls for us how Nietzsche pleaded ‘in vain for historians who can write histories equal to 
the events they relate’, in  M  Taussig ,  Walter Benjamin’s Grave ( Chicago ,  IL ,  University of Chicago Press , 
 2006 )  7 . 
 52  This is borrowed from  A  Schwarz-Bart ,  The Last of the Just ( London ,  Penguin ,  1984 )  10 , where the 
author refers to ‘the Jewish tradition of the  Lamed-waf. According to this tradition, the world reposes 
upon thirty six Just Men, the  Lamed-Waf , indistinguishable from simple mortals; often, they do not 
recognise themselves. The  Lamed-waf are the hearts of the world multiplied, into which all our griefs are 
poured, as into one receptacle’. 
 53  Case  26/62  NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen [ 1963 ] ECR (Special English Edition)  1 . 
 54  Case 6/64  Costa v ENEL [ 1964 ]  ECR (Special English Edition) 585 . 
 55  De Becker v Belgium App  214/56 Series A No 4 (ECtHR,  27 March 1962 ) . 
 56  X v Germany  App No 627/59 (ECommHR Decision,  14 December 1961 ) (Auschwitz survivor) . 
 57  See  www.holocaustresearchproject.org/trials/treblinkatrial.html . 
 58  R  Barthes ,  Camera Lucida ( London ,  Vintage ,  1993 )  65 . 
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last decade or so; the Strasbourg judicial community needed to be ‘excluded’ ( à la 
Barthes) from the Shoah in order to properly confront it. 59 
 Adopting an openness to the legacies of the Nazi era does not have to mean a 
wallowing in guilt or shame but a recognition of the fact that, as Joerges points 
out, ‘this legacy is not merely precious, it is also precarious’. 60 The management of 
Europe’s past(s) 61 is not a duty falling to one or two Member States but is a gener-
alised, European responsibility. One unpredictable outcome of a lengthy reflection 
on the nature of the legacy is that questions of German accountability have been 
brought into a European context. 62 This comes to light in  PETA (discussed below) 
where the German Government submissions are unusually apologetic in nature. 63 
 III. THE COURT OF GRIEF 
 And so it was for millions who from Luftmensch became Luft. 64 
 The legacy of the Holocaust and the Second World War is an enduring (and, para-
doxically, increasing) one of loss and grief. How do victims express this grief in 
Strasbourg? 65 Is it a fallacy that courts are non-emotional, non-sentimental spaces? 
Even if the text (the Convention) restricts and limits (because of the original sin 
as discussed above), does this, de facto, curtail the victim’s expression of loss? 
Theodor Adorno suggests that, after Auschwitz, the temporal core is to be found 
 59  There is perverse example of this in a 2006 judgment of the Austrian Supreme Court referred to 
in  PETA ; the contested PETA posters with Holocaust victims and animals juxtaposed, which were the 
subject of litigation in Germany, Austria and Strasbourg, were deemed, in Austria, to aid the  process of 
dealing with the past as they ‘had the positive effect of rekindling the memory of the  national- socialist 
genocide. The concentration camp pictures documented the historic truth and recalled  unfathomable 
crimes, which could be seen as a positive contribution to the process of dealing with the past 
 ( Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung )’.  PETA Deutschland v Germany App No  43481/09 [2012] ECHR  1888 
(ECtHR,  8 November 2012 ) , para 23, referring to Judgment No 6 Ob 321/04f (Austrian Supreme Court 
of Justice, 12 October 2006). 
 60  C  Joerges , ‘ Introduction to the Special Issue :  Confronting Memories: European “Bitter Experiences” 
and the Constitutionalization Process: Constructing Europe in the Shadow of Its Pasts ’ ( 2005 )  6  German 
Law Journal Special Issue, ed C Joerges and B Blokker 245, 246. 
 61  See Christian Joerges on this: ‘ Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit is the title of a 
 famous essay by Theodor W Adorno, written in 1959, in which he took issue with what the Germans 
have coined  Vergangenheitsbewältigung : How can Germans ever “come to terms” with Auschwitz— 
 Vergangenheitsbewältigung is defi nitely and rightfully resistant against/to translation exercises.’ ibid 248. 
 62  Exchanges with Christian Joerges, August 2007. 
 63  ‘The [German] Government considered that they should be granted a wide margin of  appreciation 
allowing a generous defi nition of the group of affected persons. This applied, in particular, in light of 
 Germany’s history, which meant that it was hardly conceivable that a German court would reach a  similar 
conclusion as the Austrian Supreme Court. Given its historical responsibility, it was Germany’s duty to 
ensure that violations of personality rights could be claimed in connection with the Holocaust. The 
 individuals depicted on the photographs were, almost without exception, unable to do this  themselves.’ 
 PETA Deutschland v Germany App No  43481/09 [2012] ECHR  1888 (ECtHR,  8 November 2012 ) , 
para 36. 
 64  Schwarz-Bart,  The Last of the Just , n 52 above. 
 65  Grief: ‘This word may be understood in French as: damage, blame, prejudice, injustice or injury 
but also … complaint, the call for punishment … In English …  grievance also expresses the subject of 
the complaint, injustice, confl ict, a wrong that must be righted, a violence to be repaired.’  J  Derrida , 
 The Politics of Friendship ( London ,  Verso ,  1997 ) ix. 
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in the screams of the victims. 66 Who, then, ‘screams’ (loudest) in Strasbourg, the 
perpetrator or the victim? From some of the case-law detailed below, one implica-
tion is that victims’ screams were not very well heard in the early years of European 
human rights. 
 Pierre Nora explores the differences between memory and history. 67 It is an 
 analysis which helps us to appreciate the dichotomy between a victim/applicant 
with  memories and the human rights judge who has to respond to the latter. A 
judicial  setting is the embodiment of Nora’s memory/history duality and disjunc-
tion.  Memory : origins in primitive/peasant rituals of passing on, in oral tradition; 
 secretive; organic; intimate.  History : formal; impenetrable; preserve of elites; a 
reconstitution of what is; besieges and petrifies memory. Nora’s perspective would 
suggest that a (human rights) court can only deal with history but will never be an 
apt  lieu for memory reception because it formalises and renders public that which is 
inherently private. 
 Hannah Arendt’s reflection on the role of the judges at the Eichmann trial reso-
nates in this context also: ‘The purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing 
else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes … can only detract from the law’s main 
business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment and 
to mete out due punishment’. 68 There are arguments which can be made in relation 
to this statement per se but even more so in the context of human rights  adjudication. 
 Finally, is the function of the (European) human rights chamber limited to doing 
justice in the case at hand or can a more constitutionally significant role (placing the 
claim in a larger, historically relevant context) be conceived of for a regional human 
rights court? 69 This was not the case in the early era of Strasbourg human rights 
jurisprudence but more recent case-law elevates the Holocaust from an individual 
compensation claim case level to a higher level as independent factor affecting the 
interpretation of specific Convention provisions. András Sajó also discusses in his 
chapter ‘how the judiciary handles past collective injustice against groups of citizens 
can be of foundational constitutional importance’. 70 
 At the  Einsatzgruppen trials in 1947 Judge Musmanno said in his judgment ‘these 
narratives go beyond the frontiers of human cruelty and savagery’. 71 In the decades 
since then, detailed knowledge about that savagery has become widely available. 
And, as well as those killing squad military trials in 1947, there have been separate 
domestic criminal trials in Germany in relation to Auschwitz, Bełżec, Sobibor and 
Treblinka. 72 Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Germany operated a long-term 
 66  Adorno, ‘The Meaning of Working Through the Past’, n 42 above, xviii. 
 67  P  Nora , ‘ Between Memory and History :  Les Lieux de Mémoire ’ ( 1989 )  26  Representations  7 . 
 68  Arendt,  Eichmann in Jerusalem , n 47 above, 253 cited in Schabas,  Unimaginable Atrocities , n 30 
above, 157 where ‘History, International Justice and Truth’ are discussed at  ch 6 . 
 69  Williams, ‘Burying, Not Praising’, n 18 above; and  S  Douglas-Scott , ‘ Europe’s Constitutional 
 Mosaic :  Human Rights in the European Legal Space—Utopia, Dystopia, Monotopia or Polytopia? ’ in 
 N  Walker ,  J  Shaw and  S  Tierney (eds),  Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2012 ) . 
 70  See Sajó, ‘Victimhood and Vulnerability As Sources of Justice’ in this volume, 337, at 339. 
 71  US v Otto Ohlendorf et al (Einsatzgruppen) United States Military Tribunals at Nuremberg ( 1948 ) 
Case No  9 , TWC Vol IV 1. 
 72  See generally Schabas,  Unimaginable Atrocities , n 30 above; and Fraser,  Law After Auschwitz , 
n 30 above. 
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restitution and compensation scheme for victims of National Socialism. 73 Yet, 
 military tribunals, criminal courts and monetary bureaucracy—it might be asked, 
is that it? It is notable that the efficiency and smooth running of the institution-
alised killing system should be matched with a convenient and minimally disruptive 
judicial and administrative response. David Fraser’s comprehensive examination 
of post-Shoah adjudication takes in (criminal) courts in France, the US, the UK, 
Canada and Australia. 74 It does not, tellingly, have a chapter on the European Court 
of Human Rights. Shoah cases are apparently everywhere save Strasbourg. Judges as 
far away Canberra 75 ‘work through the past’, deal with the consequences of an all 
too  European period of barbarity yet the human rights judges of Europe have made 
a less than significant contribution to the judicial appreciation of the Holocaust. 
Partly this is due to the original sin as discussed, the fundamental failure to include 
crimes against humanity and a concept of genocide in the ECHR; partly this is due 
to the inability of the Commission and the Court to determine which types of appli-
cants take the journey to eastern France; partly it is due to the Commission/Court 
response when a Shoah related case does reach its doors. Could all these factors 
unintentionally coalescing be said to be an example of Agamben’s ethical  aporia of 
Auschwitz, of the blindness of law after Auschwitz? 76 
 IV.  NOMEN EST NUMEN 
 It is more arduous to honour the memory of the nameless than that of the renowned. 
Historical construction is devoted to the memory of the nameless. 77 
 When viewing a global picture of case law in Strasbourg, the  punctum 78 is the case 
law (or more precisely the lack of it) relating to destruction of European Jewry. This 
is the detail that ‘pricks’ when the Strasbourg system is viewed from behind the 
veil of the Convention text so to speak. One of the decisions which embodies that 
punctum is the case of  X v Germany , 79 a European Commission on Human Rights 
(ECommHR) decision of 1961. 80 
 73  Now ‘rebranded’ as the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation,  www.stiftung-evz.
de/eng/home.htm . 
 74  Fraser,  Law After Auschwitz , n 30 above. 
 75  Minister for Home Affairs of the Commonwealth v Zentai [ 2012 ]  HCA 28 (15 August 2012) . 
 76  G  Agamben ,  Remnants of Auschwitz ( London ,  Zone Books ,  1999 ) , discussed at length in Fraser, 
 Law After Auschwitz , n 30 above,  ch 3 . 
 77  Walter Benjamin, Inscription on artwork at Port Bou cemetery, Spain where Benjamin died. 
 78  Barthes,  Camera Lucida , n 58 above, 27 on the concepts of  Studium (general appreciation (of a 
photograph)) and  Punctum : ‘The second element will break (or punctuate) the  stadium, this element 
which arises from a scene, shoots out if it like an arrow and pierces me. A Latin word exists to designate 
this wound, this prick. A photograph’s  punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, 
is poignant to me)’; 43: ‘The  punctum is a detail, a partial object’; 45: ‘There is another, (less Proustian) 
expansion of the  punctum : when, paradoxically, while remaining a detail, it fi lls the whole picture’; 51: 
‘What I can name, cannot really prick me. The incapacity to name is a good symptom of disturbance.’ 
 79  X v Germany  App No 627/59 (ECommHR Decision,  14 December 1961 ) (Auschwitz survivor) . 
 80  The European Commission of Human Rights, which operated from 1954 until 1998 when it was 
abolished, served as a fi ltering system for the Court of Human Rights, deciding on the admissibility or 
otherwise of applications from individuals, who did not have direct access to the Court itself. Many of the 
early era applications in Holocaust related cases during the  Amnesia phase failed to pass the admissibility 
scrutiny of the Commission. 
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 A.  Stolperstein 1—X (The Auschwitz Survivor) 
 X survived Auschwitz; his location at this camp can be surmised only from the 
Commission Admissibility Decision as, like the applicant himself, it is not named 
and is called camp ‘C’ only in the Decision. 81 He witnessed his whole family, all his 
relatives taken to the gas chamber there. He had previously been sent to an unnamed 
Ghetto and was at several other concentration camps before being liberated by the 
Russians in 1945. This trauma began on 9 November 1938,  Kristallnacht , 82 when 
his father’s well-established printing firm was destroyed. After the war, X reopened 
the family firm in East Germany but relocated the firm to West Germany after his 
escape from the German Democratic Republic. 
 X brings this narrative, which encapsulates almost the whole spectrum of Nazi 
Final Solution measures (pogrom, ghettoisation, extermination) to seek justice at 
Strasbourg. He may be nameless but he is the living proof, writ judicial, of the his-
tory of National Socialism and its legacy. He sees the broken glass of  Kristallnacht , 
was moved to a Ghetto then finally, the ultimate last stop, Auschwitz. What differ-
entiates X from millions of others who shared this ordeal, apart from his miraculous 
survival, is his journey to the ECtHR, bringing this explicit narrative to the heart of 
the new Europe. X’s very witnessing of the smoke of Auschwitz and a human rights 
judge within 15 years of each other captures the seismic transformations represented 
by the Strasbourg system. Did even the prospect of  human rights seem like a paral-
lel universe to somebody who had been deprived of his very  humanity ? At the very 
least, he provides a form of proof, an undeniable certainty that all this happened, 
evidence which bypasses the historian, showing the Shoah without mediation, the 
facts established without method. 83 Not that the Commissioners would not have 
known this in a general sense as, for them, in 1961, X’s story is not ‘history’ but 
merely the factual back story of an (ultimately unsuccessful) victim/applicant and is 
related and recorded as such. The Commission declares X’s claim to be inadmissible 
due to the failure to exhaust domestic remedies in West Germany. However, there 
is yet another layer of complexity in X’s application; his claim is partly based on 
the fact that in a criminal trial against him in the Federal Republic, the judges were 
former members of the Nazi party and one of the witnesses for the prosecution was 
responsible for the arrest and subsequent extermination of his parents in Auschwitz. 
First, so much for so called de-Nazification. But, how can we appraise a human 
right forum, which compels an Auschwitz survivor to pursue his claim in a judicial 
system populated by former persecutors? 
 81  Nomem est numen , to name is to know, but not in the case of this applicant who, previously only a 
number, is now an anonymous applicant. 
 82  ‘[T]he universally adopted, almost good-natured expression  Kristallnacht , designating the pogrom 
of November 1938, attests to this inclination [to use euphemistic circumlocutions in the reminiscences of 
deportations and mass murder]. A very great number claim not to have known of the events at the time, 
although Jews disappeared everywhere and although it is hardly believable that those who experienced 
what happened in the East constantly kept silent.’ Adorno, ‘The Meaning of Working Through the Past’, 
n 42 above, 4. 
 83  See Barthes,  Camera Lucida , n 58 above, 81, in this vein, discussing photographs of slaves and 
former slaves. 
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 X is a rare Strasbourg applicant in many respects; very few Jews and no Jewish 
women or children 84 appear in the early decades of European human rights law. The 
lack of an appropriate conceptual underpinning of the ECHR is therefore matched 
by a lack of applicants who might otherwise have exposed the new human rights 
regime to that which it was largely ignoring. How many European Jews have had 
the opportunity to formally ‘bear witness’ to their experiences in a judicial  setting, 
let alone a human rights one? X’s multilayered life is of even more interest to legal 
analysis when his specific complaint is considered: he alleges continuing Nazi bias 
in the judges he has had to face in post-war West Germany. Sentiment aside, though 
is difficult not to convey compassion for this persistent victim, this case  contains 
prophetic material which will not reach the academic arena for many decades 
later. X did not receive justice in Strasbourg, nor presumably in West Germany 
 thereafter given the evidence of continuing anti-Semitism and  victimisation. The 
1961 Commission was, no doubt, performing a mere administrative task in assess-
ing, formally, the exhaustion of domestic remedies by X. But it seems necessary, at 
least at this distance, to question how human rights lawyers would have sent an 
Auschwitz survivor back to West Germany to be judged by former Nazis. 
 V. THE WRONG KIND OF JUSTICE? 
 In a book considering the nature of European justice it is worth pondering if jus-
tice should serve only the good? Is there an automatic dearth or deficit of justice 
if the (money) banks are propped up while the queues at the food banks lengthen 
daily? Is justice to be judged so when it serves only the just? Do the angels get all 
the (best) tunes in a just system? While this question may be answered in a dif-
ferent way in economic terms, a human rights court delivers justice to those with 
both clean and dirty hands. 85 Thus it was that Strasbourg institutions have had 
direct contact with several former National Socialists over the years, such as in the 
applications and cases of  X (1961), 86  Ilse Koch (1962), 87  Heinz Jentzsch (1970), 88 
 Ilse Hess (1975), 89 and  Anthony Sawoniuk (2001). 90 Not all of the  stolpersteine , 
the markers of remembrance put forward here, are positive; the Strasbourg institu-
tions can be successfully mined for ‘the banality of evil’ just as much for suffering 
and injustice. 
 84  At least 1 million Jewish children and 1.5 million children altogether are estimated to have been 
murdered taking the ‘journey to Pichipoi’ (a name invented by Jewish children awaiting deportation in 
the Drancy prison/holding camp in France). 
 85  Recalling the equity maxim that, (s)he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. 
 86  X v Germany  App No 920/60 (ECommHR Decision,  19 December 1961 ) . X, a senior SS offi cer, was 
involved in the mass execution of Jews at an unidentifi ed location in the Soviet Union during 1942–43. 
This Decision was issued fi ve days after the Commission ruled in the  X v Germany  App No 627/59 
(ECommHR Decision,  14 December 1961 )(Auschwitz survivor) . 
 87  Ilse Koch v Germany  App No 1270/61 (ECommHR Decision,  8 March 1962 ) . 
 88  Heinz Jentzsch v Germany  App No 2604/65 (ECommHR Decision,  6 October 1970 ) . 
 89  Ilse Hess v United Kingdom  App No 6231/73 2 DR 72 (ECommHR Decision,  28 May 1975 ) . 
 90  Anthony Sawoniuk v United Kingdom  App No 63716/00 (ECtHR, Admissibility Decision,  29 May 
2001 ) . 
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 B.  Stolperstein 2—X (The SS Officer) 
 X was a senior SS officer who was involved in the mass extermination of Jews at an 
unidentified location during 1942–43. He was imprisoned in West Germany after 
the Second World War but was claiming compensation for being wrongly detained. 
Here is part of his claim which merits quotation at length: 
 In 1961 the District Court of C decided again that the Applicant [X] could not be released 
as there was a risk that he might fl ee the country, and it prolonged his detention until 
1962. He is claiming damages of 500,000 DM to  compensate him for loss of honour, loss 
of income, for the distress caused to his family and for the nervous depression from which 
he suffers as a result of his detention. He states that he is merely a scapegoat who exter-
minated Jews under compulsion and that the  persons responsible for the atrocities of the 
third Reich are the Western democracies and the politicians of the Weimar Republic who, 
by their  stupidity, lack of moral integrity and lack of courage, paved the way for Hitler’s 
 assumption of power. [Emphasis added.] 91 
 Whatever the ultimate result in this case, the very existence of those words in the 
ECtHR records are a testament to the nature of Holocaust appreciation in the 
decades after 1945. Furthermore, this mass murderer’s words disturb as they draw 
attention to the role of the Allies in not attempting to prevent the savagery in the 
first place. X’s application for compensation for violation of Article 5 ECHR (delay 
in trial proceedings) was deemed inadmissible. However, in a manner which was 
not followed in the  X (Auschwitz survivor) application, the Commission here places 
this SS officer’s claim into a wider context, the inadmissibility being based on the 
justification of the need for West Germany to have the time to gather evidence for 
a large trial. 92 
 C.  Stolperstein 3—Heinz Jentzsch (SS Guard) 
 The  Jentzsch decision is remarkable in the first instance as the (very lengthy) 93 
ECommHR decision considers war crimes and crimes against humanity (in the 
context of whether there are special problems of arrest and detention arising in the 
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity) and it is clearly an appli-
cation which much exercised the Commission members; there are three individual 
Opinions (two dissenting). 94 
 Heinz Jentzsch was an SS guard at Mauthausen/Gusen concentration camp and 
was detained pre-trial in Germany from 1961 until 1967. One of the methods of 
 91  X v Germany  App No 920/60 (ECommHR Decision,  19 December 1961 ) . 
 92  ‘Whereas the crimes imputed to the Applicant formed merely a part of the large-scale crimes 
 committed by the SS in the German-controlled territories in Eastern Europe in 1941–45; whereas, 
 consequently, the participation of the Applicant in the mass exterminations at B. in 1942–43 cannot be 
properly assessed in isolation but must be seen in its full perspective, which can only be obtained by a trial 
involving all those who participated in the crimes concerned.’  X v Germany  App No 920/60 (ECommHR 
Decision,  19 December 1961 ) . 
 93  Sixty-seven pages with a few hundred pages of appendices;  X v Germany  App No 627/59 
 (ECommHR Decision,  14 December 1961 ) (Auschwitz survivor) , is only four pages long. 
 94  Heinz Jentzsch v Germany  App No 2604/65 (ECommHR Decision,  6 October 1970 ) . 
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killing used in Gusen was the so-called ‘death bath’, forcing ill and/or old prisoners 
to stand under ice cold showers while being beaten (by Jentzsch and others) to death. 
He was convicted in 1968 of murdering at least 20 people and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. He was granted free legal aid to support his application to the ECtHR 
for compensation for breach of Article 5 (delayed period of detention before trial). 
 The West German Government argued that in cases of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, courts and public prosecutors were in a particularly difficult 
position which could not be measured by the same standards as ordinary criminal 
cases. 95 In terms of this chapter’s support of Williams’s assertion of the lack of 
original conceptual underpinning of the Convention, it is positive to note that the 
Commission in  Jentzsch directly addresses the issue of potential lack of jurisdic-
tion and non-retroactivity. It finds that Article 7(2) ECHR 96 covers war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. A complication arises because West Germany has entered a 
reservation as regards Article 7(2) so that it will not be applied except in accordance 
with the principles of the Article 103(2) of the  Grundgesetz such that no act can be 
punished unless it was a punishable offence before it was committed. Thus, 23 years 
before  Brunner 97 a ‘supranational’ judicial entity has a constitutional conundrum 
arising from National Socialism’s long reach. This is resolved in this instance by the 
Commission’s categorisation of Jentzsch’s case as based on Article 5(3) and a find-
ing that he  is entitled to the protection of that provision even though convicted of 
crimes against humanity. Justice for the dirty handed. 
 VI. NO SHOAH? 
 The Strasbourg institutions may have demonstrated a generalised reticence to 
engage directly with the significance of the Holocaust in the  Amnesia phase during 
the 1950s to the 1980s. As we saw above, claims during that period were, largely, 
individual, compensation type claims. The genres of Shoah case-law, however, 
segued from the compensation category to freedom of expression cases (Article 10 
ECHR) in the 1990s. No longer was the ECtHR faced with individuals with direct, 
personal experience of a death camp (as a victim or a guard) but instead with writ-
ers, journalists and others who claimed that those camps either did not exist or did 
not operate as death camps. These judgments generated a whole new category of 
‘hate speech’ case-law centered on the denial of the Holocaust. This phase of Shoah 
jurisprudence,  Negationism , represents a significant shift in several respects; the 
focus is no longer on individual Holocaust related claims per se but rather a consid-
eration of the freedom of expression rights of those who contest it. The judgments 
necessarily move away from a direct confrontation of Holocaust suffering to a gen-
eralised, scientific level of appreciation of the Holocaust. Yet, despite the distance 
in terms of applicants and substance, the ECtHR is, perversely, by this era dealing 
with the Shoah in a more extensive way than it has done since its establishment. The 
 95  Heinz Jentzsch v Germany  App No 2604/65 (ECommHR Decision,  6 October 1970 ) , para 7. 
 96  ‘This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission 
which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
 recognized by civilized nations’. 
 97  BVerfGE 89, 155, 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92 (12 October 1993). 
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outcome of a range of cases in this context is the establishment of a precedent that 
the negation or revision of the Holocaust will engender a specific interpretation of 
Articles 10 and 17 ECHR. 98 As the Grand Chamber stated in  Lehideux and Isorni , 
‘[the disputed publication] does not belong to the category of clearly established his-
torical facts—such as the Holocaust—whose negation or revision would be removed 
from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17’. 99 In essence, after  Lehideux , it is 
clearly established that the European human rights system recognises a special level 
of protection for the facts of the Holocaust. This has been confirmed by the Court 
in  Witzsch 100 and  Garaudy . 101 
 VII. ‘THE HOLOCAUST ON YOUR PLATE’ 
 We enter a third phase ( Particularity ) of Holocaust jurisprudence with the recent 
judgments in  Hoffer and Annen 102 and, especially,  PETA . 103 Particularity in this 
context refers to the evolution and maturation of the Strasbourg judicial approach 
to a point where the unique nature of the Holocaust in Europe’s past is recognised 
above and beyond mere denial scenarios. 
 D.  Stolperstein 4—PETA 
 In 2004, the animal rights organisation, PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals) planned an advertising campaign in Germany to be called ‘The 
Holocaust on your plate’. This involved posters with death camp photographs on 
one side opposite images of animals. 104 The intended campaign was challenged by 
    98  See, interalia,  Marais v France  App No 31159/96 86 DR 184 (ECommHR Decision,  24 June 1996 ) ; 
 Honsik v Austria  App No 25062/94 83 DR 77 (ECommHR Decision,  18 October 1995 ) ;  Lehideux and Isorni 
v France App No 24662/94 [ 1998 ]  ECHR 90 [2000] 30 EHRR  665 (ECtHR (GC), 23 September 1998) . 
    99  Lehideux and Isorni v France App No 24662/94 [ 1998 ]  ECHR 90 [2000] 30 EHRR  665 (ECtHR 
(GC), 23 September 1998) , para 46. 
 100  ‘Against this background, the Court fi nds that the public interest in the prevention of crime and 
disorder due to disparaging statements regarding the Holocaust, and the requirements of protecting the 
interests of the victims of the nazi regime, outweigh, in a democratic society the applicant’s freedom to 
impart views denying the existence of gas chambers and mass murder therein.’  Witzsch v Germany  App 
No 41448/98 (ECtHR, Admissibility Decision,  20 April 1999 ) , para 1. 
 101  Garaudy v France App  65831/01 [ 2003 ] ECHR IX (ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, 7 July 2003) . 
 102  Hoffer and Annen v Germany App Nos  397/07 and 2322/07 [2011] ECHR  46 (ECtHR,  13  January 
2011 ) . 
 103  PETA Deutschland v Germany App No  43481/09 [2012] ECHR  1888 (ECtHR,  8 November 
2012 ) . 
 104  ‘The intended campaign, which had been carried out in a similar way in the United States of 
 America, consisted of a number of posters, each of which bore a photograph of concentration camp 
inmates along with a picture of animals kept in mass stocks, accompanied by a short text. One of the 
posters showed a photograph of emaciated, naked concentration camp inmates alongside a photograph 
of starving cattle under the heading “walking skeletons”. Other posters showed a photograph of piled 
up human dead bodies alongside a photograph of a pile of slaughtered pigs under the heading “fi nal 
 humiliation” and of rows of inmates lying on stock beds alongside rows of chicken in laying batteries 
 under the heading “if animals are concerned, everybody becomes a Nazi”. Another poster depicting a 
starving, naked male inmate alongside a starving cattle bore the title “The Holocaust on your plate” 
and the text “Between 1938 and 1945, 12 million human beings were killed in the Holocaust. As many 
animals are killed every hour in Europe for the purpose of human consumption”.  PETA Deutschland v 
Germany App No  43481/09 [2012] ECHR  1888 (ECtHR,  8 November 2012 ) , para 7. 
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three Holocaust survivors who successfully sought an injunction, though the case 
spent five years in the German judicial system. PETA then pleaded Article 10 in 
Strasbourg where, ultimately, no breach was found. 
 PETA should be given to every first year law student to watch them unravel 
the labyrinth of human rights versus animal welfare, cultural relativism, historical 
significance, multilayered adjudication and human rights universality.  PETA is not 
an uncomplicated decision; the majority judgment was followed by an, apparently, 
concurring Opinion from the President of the Court, Judge Spielmann and the 
Slovenian Judge Zupančič. The latter take issue, in forceful and persuasive terms, 
with what might be called the  exceptionalism element of the judgment. That is, 
German exceptionalism to the extent that the judgment states that the offensive 
advertising campaign was unacceptable and not permitted by Article 10 but  only 
in Germany. 105 This relativisation of freedom of expression is condemned in the 
minority Opinion, according to which, the debasement of death camp victims by 
comparing them to hens and pigs should be unacceptable from Azerbaijan to Iceland 
and not just in Germany. In 1961, the fact of ex-Nazi judges judging an Auschwitz 
survivor is not a Strasbourg concern but deemed to be a domestic German issue. 
By 2012, advertising which is offensive to Holocaust victims is very much a matter 
for Strasbourg adjudication. One important reading of this minority Opinion, if not 
the judgment, in  PETA , is the Europeanisation of the legacy of the Holocaust, as 
brought about by Strasbourg human rights. 
 VIII. THE ORIGIN IS THE GOAL 
 Adorno thought it inconceivable that ‘life would continue normally’ after the Shoah 
and a sense of shame prevented him writing eloquently about Auschwitz. 106 In 
1959, at the same time as the first judgments issued from Strasbourg, he discerned 
in Germany a rejection of the past that would cheat the murder victims of their right 
to be remembered, there was ‘an empty and cold forgetting’: 107 ‘Suffering needed to 
be enabled to speak. Law and philosophy today must be one in which suffering in 
death camps is present in every one of its sentences’. 108 
 How to apply this to the history of jurisprudence at Strasbourg? This chapter 
began with arguments about the original lack of philosophy and purpose and closes 
with an acknowledgement that, if ‘the origin is the goal’, 109 the Strasbourg institu-
tions have gradually, eventually approached that goal/origin. It might still be said 
 105  ‘The Court considers that the facts of this case cannot be detached from the historical and social 
context in which the expression of opinion takes place. It observes that a reference to the Holocaust must 
also be seen in the specifi c context of the German past and respects the Government’s stance that they 
deem themselves under a special obligation towards the Jews living in Germany … In the light of this, 
the Court considers that the domestic courts gave relevant and suffi cient reasons for granting the civil 
 injunction against the publication of the posters. This is not called into question by the fact that courts in 
other jurisdictions might address similar issues in a different way’.  PETA Deutschland v Germany App 
No  43481/09 [2012] ECHR  1888 (ECtHR,  8 November 2012 ) , para 49. 
 106  Adorno, ‘The Meaning of Working Through the Past’, n 42 above, xi. 
 107  ibid, xii. 
 108  ibid. 
 109  Attributed to Karl Kraus in  P  Szondi , ‘ Hope in the Past :  On Walter Benjamin ’ in  W  Benjamin , 
 Berlin Childhood Around 1900 ( Harvard ,  Harvard University Press ,  2006 )  29 . 
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of cases such as  X (Auschwitz survivor) above that ‘it’s as good as if it never hap-
pened; the murdered are to be cheated out of the single remaining thing that our 
powerlessness can offer them: remembrance’. 110 But, taking a route via Holocaust 
denial, the Strasbourg human rights system has reached a point where the ‘origin’, 
the ignored shadow against with the ECHR was drafted, has now acquired a status 
in the case-law which begins to accord mass extermination and suffering value and 
recognition in itself. 
 IX. ENDING 
 In Europe, there are positions to defend. 111 
 It was reported in a Dutch newspaper in February 1942 that potatoes were to be 
transported to Berlin in heated railway wagons so as to prevent frost damage. 112 The 
human occupants of German railway wagons at the same time were not so fortu-
nate. In this small insight into a united Europe under German control in 1942, there 
are echoes of a united Europe of the future. Might it be said that European integra-
tion is still overly concerned with potatoes, goods, property, standardisation and 
health and safety rather than with humanity? And, moreover, that this preoccupa-
tion  contributes to a hindering of the achievement of justice at the European level? 113 
 I suggest at the close of this chapter that, despite the lack of appropriate concep-
tual underpinning or a founding philosophy in Strasbourg, the current and more 
recent jurisprudence evidences a human rights system formulating and supplying a 
kind of justice which now recognises the ‘origin’ and is beginning to be that which it 
was not allowed to be in 1950. The Convention  acquis 114 is enriched and enhanced 
ultimately rather than devalued by unearthing the ‘sins’ of the past. In exposing 
the institutional approaches to Europe’s pasts it can be seen that the ECHR is, and 
needs to be, more than a self-serving collective insurance policy (against totalitari-
anism). 115 ‘The past will have been worked through only when the causes of what 
happened then have been eliminated. Only because the causes continue to exist does 
the captivating spell of the past remain to this day unbroken’. 116 
 And praised be Auschwitz. So be it. Maidenek. The Eternal. Treblinka. And praised be 
Buchenwald. So be it. Mauthausen. The Eternal. Belzec. And praised be Sobibor. So be 
it. Chelmno. The Eternal. Ponary. And praised be Theresienstadt. So be it. Warsaw. The 
Eternal. Wilno. And praised be Skarzysko. So be it. Bergen Belsen. The Eternal. Janow. And 
praised be Dora. So be it. Nuengamme. The Eternal. Pustkow. And praised be … 117 
 
 110  Adorno, ‘The Meaning of Working Through the Past’, n 42 above, 5. 
 111  Walter Benjamin, justifying his decision not to leave Europe in 1936, discussed by Peter Szondi in 
his ‘Hope in the Past’, n 109 above, 33. 
 112  De Courant / Nieuws Van Den Dag (2 February 1942). 
 113  Pope Francis’s comments on Europe’s failings are in the same vein, ‘Pope Francis complains of 
“haggard” Europe in Strasbourg’  BBC News (25 November 2014),  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-30180667 . 
 114  Douglas-Scott, ‘Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic’, n 69 above. 
 115  ibid. 
 116  Adorno, ‘The Meaning of Working Through the Past’, n 42 above, 18. 
 117  Schwarz-Bart,  The Last of the Just , n 52 above, 383. 
